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CALLAHAN V. EDGEWATER CARE &
REHABILITATION CENTER:
THE ILLINOIS WHISTLEBLOWER ACT DOES
NOT PREEMPT THE COMMON LAW TORT
OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
INTRODUCTION
Judith Shores, a nursing assistant at Senior Manor Nursing Center,
observed a co-worker falling asleep during her shift, failing to super-
vise the administration of prescription drugs, and refusing to assist
nursing home residents with their needs.' Believing that this conduct
endangered the "health, welfare, and safety" of the nursing home re-
sidents, Shores reported the situation to an administrator. 2 Shortly
thereafter, the home fired her.3 Shores brought an action against the
nursing home under the Illinois common law tort of retaliatory dis-
charge.4 The nursing home argued that Shores could not state a claim
for retaliatory discharge, because she did not report the nurse's neg-
lect to the Illinois Department of Public Health. 5 The Fifth District
rejected this argument, holding that it made no difference under the
common law whether nursing home employees reported neglect to
their supervisors or to the Department of Public Health. The com-
mon law provided a remedy for both.6
With the enactment of the Illinois Whistleblower Act, 7 however, it
appeared that employees like Shores could lose their protection
against retaliatory discharge. The common law tort of retaliatory dis-
charge encompasses both internal and external whistleblower claims. 8
1. See Shores v. Senior Manor Nursing Ctr., 518 N.E.2d 471, 472 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 475.
6. Id.
7. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1-35 (2004).
8. Illinois defines "whistleblowing" as "the reporting of illegal or improper conduct." Suther-
land v. Norfolk S. Ry., 826 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Illinois courts have recognized
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge "in only two situations: (1) where the discharge stems
from exercising rights pursuant to the Worker's Compensation Act or (2) where the discharge is
for 'whistleblowing' activities." Id. The whistleblowing category includes the "situation where a
worker was fired for refusing to engage in conduct that violated public policy, as opposed to
reporting an employer for violating the law." Stebbings v. Univ. of Chi., 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1141
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Internal whistleblowers report information directly to someone within
their organization. 9 External whistleblowers disclose information to a
government or law enforcement agency, 10 the media, I or a regulatory
authority.' 2 Illinois courts found this broad protection necessary "to
protect employees who urge enforcement of Illinois public policy.'
' 3
This comprehensive protection was jeopardized when the Illinois
Whistleblower Act took effect on January 1, 2004."4 The
Whistleblower Act only protects whistleblowers who disclose informa-
tion to a "government or law enforcement agency" or "in a court, an
administrative hearing, or before a legislative commission or commit-
tee."' 5  In retaliatory discharge actions brought by internal
whistleblowers, employer-defendants argued that the Whistleblower
Act preempted the common law tort of retaliatory discharge and pro-
vided the exclusive remedy for all whistleblower claims.1 6
In Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center, the First
District held that the Whistleblower Act did not repeal the common
law cause of action for retaliatory discharge where individuals are
fired "for reporting illegal or improper activity to someone other than
a government or law enforcement official."' 17 This Note argues that
the Appellate Court correctly interpreted the law of preemption and
that the decision is sound in terms of public policy.'8 Part II discusses
the tort of retaliatory discharge, compares the tort to the Illinois
Whistleblower Act, and examines prior case law addressing the pre-
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 377 (Ill. 1985),
discussed infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text). This Note focuses on the whistleblowing
prong of the tort of retaliatory discharge.
9. Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to
Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 890 (2004); Elletta Sangrey Callahan &
Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Char-
acteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 151, 151 (1994); Michael Delikat & Jill L.
Rosenberg, Understanding Developments in Whistleblower Law 2 Years After Sarbanes-Oxley,
Defending Whistleblower Claims Under the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 718 PRACTISINC L. INST. 9, 28
(2005).
10. Callahan et al., supra note 9, at 890.
11. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 9, at 151.
12. Delikat & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 32.
13. Lanning v. Morris Mobile Meals, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Il. App. Ct. 1999).
14. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1-35 (2004).
15. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004).
16. See, e.g., Thomas v. Guardsmark, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 531. 535 (7th Cir. 2007); Krum v. Chi.
Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Il1. App. Ct. 2006).
17. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *1-2 (Ill.
App. Ct. July 3, 2007).
18. Originally, this Note urged the First District to decide that the Whistleblower Act does not
preempt retaliatory discharge. Because Callahan was decided while this Note was being pre-
pared for publication, it will explain why Callahan was well-reasoned and illustrate how this
outcome will protect Illinois public policy.
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emption issue. 19 Part III discusses the Callahan decision.20 Part IV
demonstrates that, based on the criteria for determining common law
preemption questions, the Callahan court correctly held that the
Whistleblower Act does not preempt retaliatory discharge claims
brought by internal whistleblowers. 21 Part V illustrates that preserv-
ing a cause of action for whistleblowers who do not report to a gov-
ernment or law enforcement agency is vital to enforcing Illinois public
policy.22 Part VI concludes that Callahan's holding was correct, be-
cause the legislature did not intend to deprive a large class of
whistleblowers of their remedy.2 3
II. BACKGROUND
To determine the status of whistleblower protection in Illinois, one
must first examine the development of the common law tort of retalia-
tory discharge. 24 Furthermore, an analysis of the similarities and dif-
ferences between the tort and the Whistleblower Act demonstrates
how both remedies may coexist.25 This Part examines several illustra-
tive Whistleblower Act cases decided prior to Callahan.26
A. The Common Law Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court first recog-
nized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.2 7 There, an em-
ployee was fired for exercising her rights under the Workers'
Compensation Act.28 The Kelsay court held that a remedy for retalia-
tory discharge must exist in order to implement the Workers' Com-
pensation Act.29
Three years later, in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., the
Illinois Supreme Court further defined the scope of the tort.30 In
Palmateer, an employee was fired for reporting a co-worker's illegal
conduct to the police. 31 The court extended the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge, reasoning that this extension was necessary to protect public
19. See infra notes 24-102 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 103-118 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 119-210 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 211-243 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 27-63 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 73-102 and accompanying text.
27. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Il1. 1978).
28. Id. at 355.
29. Id. at 357.
30. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 (I11. 1981).
31. Id.
2007]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:161
policy. 32 The court found that the tort of retaliatory discharge was an
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. 33 It noted that this ex-
ception is based on the rule that a contract cannot incorporate "rights
and obligations" that are contrary to public policy. 34 The court stated
that "all that is required [to state a cause of action for retaliatory dis-
charge] is that the employer discharge the employee in retaliation for
the employee's activities, and that the discharge be in contravention of
a clearly mandated public policy."'35 Further, the court found that,
where employees report criminal activity, public policy favors "citizen
crime-fighters., 36
After Palmateer, Illinois courts attempted to determine which retali-
atory discharge actions were supported by public policy. In Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Corp., the First District first addressed whether the
tort of retaliatory discharge protects internal whistleblowers. 37 In Pe-
trik, Monarch Printing Company fired its vice president after he re-
ported suspicions of illegal conduct within the company. 38 The trial
court dismissed Petrik's retaliatory discharge claim, stating that, be-
cause Petrik disclosed his suspicions of illegal conduct to his employer
rather than to public officials, he did not state a claim that affected a
matter of public policy. 39 The First District disagreed with the trial
32. Id. at 878-81. "The foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of
public policy." Id. at 880.
33. Id. at 878 (citing Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. v. Jones, 367 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1977)). The employment at-will doctrine is "the rule that an employment contract of unspec-
ified duration is terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee. According to this
rule, an employee could quit or be fired at any time, with or without cause, and no liability would
arise for the termination." Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 444 N.E.2d 588, 590 (I11. App. Ct.
1982).
34. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (citing People ex rel. Peabody v. Chi. Gas Trust Co., 22 N.E.
798 (Ill. 1889)). The court in Stebbings v. University of Chicago, 726 N.E.2d 1136 (III. App. Ct.
2000), stated that the law of retaliatory discharge "aims to strike a proper balance among em-
ployers' interests in operating their businesses efficiently, employees' interests in earning a liveli-
hood and society's interests in seeing its public policies carried out." Id. at 1140.
35. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 881. The court stated that although "there is no precise defini-
tion of [public policy] ... it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what
affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and
statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions." Id. at 878 (citing Smith v. Bd. of
Educ., 89 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ill. 1950)). Furthermore, the court explained that "there is no precise
line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely
personal," but that the "matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before the tort [of retaliatory discharge] will be allowed." Id. at 878-79.
36. Id. at 880. The Palmateer court made it clear that law enforcement could only be effective
if citizens were free to report what they believed to be illegal activity without fear of being
discharged. Id. (citing Joiner v. Benton Cmty. Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Ill. 1980)).
37. Petrik, 444 N.E.2d at 590.
38. Id. at 589.
39. Id. at 590.
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court's assessment that the situation involved a "mere internal dis-
pute," stating that "the public policy considerations that underlie
Palmateer also support Petrik's conduct. '40 In short, the court found
that Petrik stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 41
In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., the Illinois Supreme Court
found that an internal disclosure did not bar a retaliatory discharge
claim. 42 Specifically, the court recognized a cause of action for an em-
ployee who was discharged for refusing to work in hazardous condi-
tions that violated a "clearly mandated public policy."' 43 The Supreme
Court stated the following:
We do not agree with the appellate court that the question whether
the facts as alleged involved public policy, or a matter of private
concern, depended upon whether a complaint was made to the reg-
ulatory authorities. The legislation and the regulations declared the
public policy, and the existence of that public policy did not depend
upon whether plaintiff had communicated a complaint to the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission or whether its investigation preceded
or followed that compliant.44
Similarly, in Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., the Fifth District ex-
tended the tort of retaliatory discharge to claims by internal
whistleblowers. 45 Recognizing Johnson's cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge, the court stated that his failure to report the suspected
violations to law enforcement officials was inconsequential. 46
In Zaniecki v. P.A. Bergner & Co. of Illinois, the Third District took
an opposing view by refusing to recognize a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge where an employee made an internal disclosure.47 In
that case, a store supervisor reported what he perceived to be his man-
ager's criminal activity to the store's chief security officer.48 The em-
ployee claimed that he was fired in retaliation and sued for retaliatory
discharge. 49 The court dismissed the claim, stating that "[n]o such
public policy is immediately evident in the relationship between an
employee and his superiors. '50 In other words, the court found that
40. Id. at 592.
41. Id. at 593.
42. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 376 (I11. 1985).
43. Id. at 377.
44. Id. at 376.
45. Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 575, 579-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
46. Id. at 578-79.
47. Zaniecki v. P.A. Bergner & Co., 493 N.E.2d 419, 421-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
48. Id. at 420.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 421. The Zaniecki court apparently reconciled its decision with Wheeler by stating,
"[W]e find Petrick to be an unwarranted extension of Palmateer insofar as the critical element of
public authority involvement is lacking and there is no state or federal statute, constitution, or
2007]
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firing an employee for reporting illegal conduct to law enforcement
officials violates a clear public policy. 51 In contrast, the court consid-
ered a disclosure to a person within the organization to be a private
concern.
52
In Lanning v. Morris Mobile Meals, Inc., the Third District recon-
sidered whether failure to report a violation to a public official pre-
cludes a retaliatory discharge claim. 53 There, a food service employee
reported to her supervisor that her co-workers were endangering cus-
tomers' health by leaving food unrefrigerated for extended periods of
time.54 Lanning believed that these incidents constituted health code
violations. 55 Lanning was fired, and she subsequently sued for retalia-
tory discharge.5 6
The Lanning court set forth the elements of a prima facie claim for
retaliatory discharge, originally stated in Palmateer: "To succeed on a
claim of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must show 'that she was (1)
discharged; (2) in retaliation for her activities; and (3) that the dis-
charge violates a clear mandate of public policy." 57 The court re-
jected the additional obligation imposed by Zaniecki requiring an
employee to make a complaint to a public official. 58 The court noted
that the result in Zaniecki was "in direct conflict with the [F]irst and
[F]ifth [d]istricts. ' '59 Specifically, the court stated that Palmateer ap-
plied equally to cases involving internal whistleblowers, because, like
complaints made to public officials, internal reports can ultimately
correct behavior that violates public policy. 60 In some cases, the court
case law which would arguably protect plaintiff's activities." Id. at 422. The First District later
clarified what type of law to which a plaintiff must point to support a retaliatory discharge claim
in Stebbings. 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). There, the court stated that "[i]t is not
necessary for a plaintiff attempting to state a claim for retaliatory discharge to cite to a statute
making his or her firing illegal." Id. The plaintiff, however, must cite law, "be it a statute,
constitutional provision or judicial decision," that "enunciate[s] a public policy that plainly cov-
ers the situation to which the plaintiff objects." Id.
51. Zaniecki, 493 N.E.2d at 421.
52. Id. at 421-22 (stating that although there may be good reasons to protect internal
whistleblowers, Palmateer did not support extending retaliatory discharge to internal
whistleblower situations).
53. Lanning v. Morris Mobile Meals, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Il. App. Ct. 1999).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, 519 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ill. 1988)).
58. Id.
59. Lanning, 720 N.E 2d at 1130 (citing Johnson v. World Color Press Inc., 498 N.E.2d 575 (11U.
App. Ct. 1986); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 444 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
60. Id. ("Since the thrust of Palmateer was to protect employees who urge enforcement of
Illinois public policy . . . Johnson and Petrik reasoned that employees who expose violations
deserve protection, regardless of whether they choose internal or external processes.").
[Vol. 57:161
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noted, employers can handle wrongdoing more effectively than regu-
latory agencies. Thus, it makes sense to encourage employees to re-
port possible misconduct to their employers. 6'
By allowing internal whistleblowers to state a retaliatory discharge
claim, the Lanning court articulated the tort's central goal:
"[e]mployees contemplating a complaint must not be intimidated by
fear of retaliation . . . whenever the health, safety or welfare of the
public is involved. '62 Lanning illustrates the preference of Illinois
courts to include causes of action by internal whistleblowers in the tort
of retaliatory discharge. 63
B. The Illinois Whistleblower Act
On January 1, 2004, the Illinois Whistleblower Act went into ef-
fect.64  Although each addresses wrongful termination, the
Whistleblower Act is both broader and narrower than the tort of re-
taliatory discharge. Specifically, the Act is broader than the tort in
four ways. First, the Act includes independent contractors in its defi-
nition of "employees. ' 65 Second, the Act prohibits employers from
adopting rules that prevent employees from making disclosures pro-
tected by the Act. 66 Third, the Act provides that reinstatement, back
pay with interest, and litigation costs and attorney's fees must be
61. Id. at 1131. ("Employers are undoubtedly in the best position to rectify problems with
food preparation, handling and storage. Failure to protect an employee who raises health con-
cerns, even to his immediate supervisor, may stifle the willingness of other employees to com-
plain of similar problems. To protect the public, this result must be avoided.").
62. Id. at 1130-31 (emphasis added).
63. See also Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that an
internal complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action); Parr v. Triplett Corp., 727 F. Supp.
1163, 1166 (N.D. I11. 1989) ("[A] clear mandate of public policy is violated when an employee is
discharged for reporting criminal activity to his employer."); Hicks v. Clyde Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n., 722 F. Supp. 501, 504 (N.D. I11. 1989) (holding that "well-intentioned employees" should
not be penalized for attempting "to rectify wrongdoing internally prior to taking public action");
Stebbings v. Univ. of Chi., 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1145 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) ("[R]eporting to superiors
in a company as well as to outside authorities is protected."); Fragassi v. Neiburger, 646 N.E.2d
315 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (implicitly allowing an internal complaint); Shores v. Senior Manor Nurs-
ing Ctr., 518 N.E.2d 471, 476 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that a nurse's complaint to a nursing
home administrator was sufficient to state a retaliatory discharge claim).
64. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1-35 (2004).
65. Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/5 (2004) ("'Employee' means any individual who is
employed on a full-time, part-time, or contractual basis by an employer."), with New Horizons
Elecs. Mktg., Inc. v. Clarion Corp., 561 N.E.2d 283, 285 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that an
independent contractor cannot bring a retaliatory discharge claim).
66. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/10 (2004) ("An employer may not make, adopt, or enforce any
rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing information to a government
or law enforcement agency if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information
discloses a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.").
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awarded to successful plaintiffs.67 Finally, in addition to providing
grounds for a civil claim, a violation of the Act constitutes a Class A
misdemeanor. 68
The Whistleblower Act is narrower than the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge in two significant ways. First, the Act only protects disclosures
made by employees who have "reasonable cause to believe that the
information discloses a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or reg-
ulation."'69 This departs from the common law, which protects disclo-
sures in all situations implicating public policy matters. 70 Second, the
Act states that "[a]n employer may not retaliate against an employee
for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement
agency" or for disclosing information "in a court, an administrative
hearing, or before a legislative commission or committee."' 7' As illus-
trated above, common law courts explicitly rejected the requirement
that an employee must disclose to a government or law enforcement
agency. 72
C. Cases Addressing the Whistleblower Act
The Illinois Whistleblower Act fails to address its effect on the tort
of retaliatory discharge. This failure prompted employers to defend
against internal whistleblower claims by arguing that the Act pre-
empted the tort. In Krum v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc.,
a trial court held that the Whistleblower Act preempted retaliatory
discharge. 73 The First District, however, dismissed the case on a dif-
ferent ground.74 Plaintiff, Sandy Krum, an assistant athletic trainer
for the Chicago Cubs, had signed a one-year employment contract. 75
On August 16, 2004, Krum met with the Cubs's general manager. 76 At
that meeting, Krum discussed other employees' misconduct, including
that the Cubs's head athletic trainer lacked a license required under
67. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/30 (2004).
68. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/25 (2004).
69. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004). Like the cause of action recognized in Wheeler v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (IlM. 1985). the Whistleblower Act also prohibits an em-
ployer from retaliating against an employee "for refusing to participate in an activity that would
result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation." 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/20
(2004).
70. See Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876. 881 (IlI. 1981).
71. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004).
72. See supra notes 27-63.
73. Krum v. Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club. Inc., 851 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 623.
76. Id.
[Vol. 57:161
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Illinois law. 77 Krum was terminated shortly thereafter, 78 and he sued
the Cubs for wrongful termination.79 The First District dismissed the
case, stating that "the failure to renew an employment contract for a
fixed duration could not serve as a basis for a retaliatory discharge
claim." The court did not reach the preemption issue.80
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit did not decide the preemption ques-
tion in Thomas v. Guardsmark, L.L.C., even though it was the only
issue on appeal.81 In that case, the plaintiff worked as a security guard
for Guardsmark.8 2 Guardsmark fired the plaintiff shortly after he ap-
peared in a televised investigative report about the lack of regulation
of security guards in Illinois.8 3 In his interview, the plaintiff stated
that a fellow security guard had bragged about having a felony crimi-
nal record.8 4 The plaintiff was suspended and subsequently fired for
his report.8 5 The plaintiff sued for retaliatory discharge, and a jury
found in his favor.86
On appeal, Guardsmark argued that the Whistleblower Act codi-
fied and preempted retaliatory discharge and that the plaintiff did not
meet the elements of the Act, because he did not report his claim to a
"government or law enforcement agency. '87 The plaintiff contended
that the statutory requirements of the Whistleblower Act were irrele-
vant, because he brought suit under retaliatory discharge.88 Because
the plaintiff filed suit more than a year before the Whistleblower Act
went into effect, the Seventh Circuit held that the statute did not ap-
ply retroactively and, thus, never reached the preemption issue.8 9
Similarly, Sutherland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. implicated
but did not decide the preemption issue. 90 In that case, the plaintiff
alleged that his former employer had fired him for reporting an injury
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Krum, 851 N.E.2d at 623.
80. Id. at 624-25.
81. 487 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2007).
82. Id. at 533.
83. Id.
84. Id. That case illustrates another major type of whistleblowing: disclosures made to the
media. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 9, at 151. Callahan and Dworkin discuss the legal
system's "general disinclination to extend recourse to media whistleblowers [, which is] rein-
forced by the perception that reporters are used by less 'worthy' whistleblowers: those with
groundless claims, those who are vengeful, and those with other ignoble motives." Id.
85. Guardsmark, 487 F.3d at 533.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 536.
88. Id. at 533.
89. Id. at 536.
90. Sutherland v. Norfolk S. Ry., 826 N.E.2d 1021 (Il. App. Ct. 2005).
2007]
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that plaintiff had suffered on the job and to prevent him from filing a
claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) and the
Federal Boiler Inspection Act (FBIA). 91 The Sutherland court began
its analysis of the retaliatory discharge claim by summarizing the his-
tory of the tort.92 In a footnote, the court stated that "[t]he
'whistleblower' cause of action has since been codified in the
Whistleblower Act."'93
Employer-defendants in retaliatory discharge suits seized upon this
language, arguing that it proved that the Whistleblower Act pre-
empted the common law claim. 94 In Jones v. Dew, Jones complained
to her supervisors about rat infestation at her workplace. 95 After
Jones's supervisors ignored her complaints, the infestation wors-
ened. 96 Consequently, Jones suffered "mental and physical health
problems," which required a medical leave.97 Before Jones's doctor
approved her return to work, Habilitative Services, Inc. terminated
her employment. 98 The trial court held that "the Act codifies, and
therefore preempts, any common law retaliatory discharge claim
based on whistle-blowing activities." 99 The court based its reasoning
almost entirely on the Sutherland footnote, which stated that the Act
"codified" the tort. 0° Because Jones complained to her supervisors
rather than to a law enforcement or government agency, the court
found that she did not fall within the protections of the Whistleblower
Act and dismissed her claim. 1° 1 Shortly after Jones, in Riedlinger v.
Hudson Respiratory Care, Inc., a trial court relied on the Jones analy-
sis to hold that a worker could not state a claim under the
Whistleblower Act, because he had complained of mold contamina-
tion in the employer's facility to the employer rather than to the Food
and Drug Administration.10 2
91. Id. at 1023.
92. Id. at 1025-27.
93. Id. at 1025 n.4. Accord Bajalo v. Nw. Univ., 860 N.E. 2d 556, 581 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)
("The 'whistleblower' cause of action has been codified in the Illinois Whistleblower Act.").
94. See, e.g., Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 4,
Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 05-L-006795 (Cook County Ill. Cir. Ct. July 13,
2006).
95. No. 06-C-3577, 2006 WL 3718053, at *1 (N.D. Il1. Dec. 13, 2006).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *3.
101. Jones, 2006 WL 3718053, at *3. See infra notes 203-209 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Jones analysis.
102. Riedlinger v. Hudson Respiratory Care, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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III. SUBJECT OPINION
In Callahan, the First District squarely addressed whether the
Whistleblower Act preempted retaliatory discharge. 10 3 Melissa Calla-
han worked as an admissions clerk at a nursing home operated by
Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center.10 4 Callahan became aware
that a patient at the facility was being held against her will, which
Callahan believed violated the Nursing Home Care Act and the Illi-
nois Administrative Code. 0 5 After reporting this suspicion to her
supervisor and the nursing home administrator, Callahan was dis-
charged.' 0 6 Callahan sought relief under the common law, but the
trial court dismissed her action.'0 7 The court ruled that the
Whistleblower Act preempted the common law tort and found that
Callahan had not stated a claim under the Act, because she did not
report to government or law enforcement officials. 10 8 The First Dis-
trict reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the Act did not
preempt the common law cause of action.10 9
The Callahan court rejected the preemption argument for several
reasons. First, the court pointed out that Edgewater Care relied heav-
ily upon Jones and Riedlinger, which rested their holdings on the Suth-
erland footnote stating that "the 'whistleblower' cause of action has
since been codified in the Whistleblower Act."110 The court rejected
the Jones and Riedlinger holdings, because neither court used the pre-
emption doctrine to interpret the issue."' Second, the court noted
that, because the Whistleblower Act does not expressly preempt any
common law remedy, the only way the Act could repeal the tort was
by implication. 112 The court stated that the rule on preemption by
implication "has long been that a statute will not be construed as tak-
ing away a common-law right . . . unless the pre-existing right is so
repugnant to the statute that the survival of the common-law right
would in effect deprive the statute of its efficacy and render its provi-
sions nugatory. 113
103. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *1-2
(Ill. App. Ct. July 3, 2007).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Callahan, 2007 WL 1932736, at *4.
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id. at *3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Additionally, the court found that there was no conflict between the
Whistleblower Act and the common law rights of individuals who re-
port illegal or improper conduct to their supervisors. 1t 4 The court rea-
soned that the statute's language and legislative history did not
demonstrate intent to repeal the common law remedy for internal
whistleblowers.11 5 Furthermore, the court presumed that the legisla-
ture knew that the common law remedy existed and stated that the
legislature could have easily repealed the common law remedy. 116 Fi-
nally, the court noted differences between the Whistleblower Act and
the common law, but stated that these differences alone did not create
"any irreconcilable conflicts with the persistence of a common-law
remedy."' 17 In short, the court held that the Whistleblower Act does
not preempt the common law tort of retaliatory discharge for internal
whistleblowers and allowed Callahan to proceed on her common law
claim. 18
IV. ANALYSIS
The First District reached the correct result in Callahan, because it
based its holding on the preemption doctrine. This Part elaborates,
upon Callahan's reasoning and explains why the court's analysis was
sound. Section A shows that the Illinois legislature neither expressly
nor impliedly replaced the common law cause of action with the
Whistleblower Act. 119 Section B demonstrates that decisions prior to
Callahan discussing whether the Whistleblower Act preempted retali-
atory discharge failed to apply the law of preemption. 120
A. Preemption Doctrine
While there are no set criteria for deciding whether a statute
preempts or repeals the common law, case law shows that some indi-
114. Id. The court did not decide whether the common law cause of action remains intact for
individuals who report to a government or law enforcement agency or for individuals who refuse
to work in conditions that contravene public policy. Id. Because the Whistleblower Act affords
these individuals "far greater relief than the common law," this Note does not address this issue.
Id. The reasoning in Callahan, however, should apply to other types of whistleblowers, such as
media whistleblowers, who are not protected under the Whistleblower Act, but have historically
been afforded relief under the common law.
115. Callahan, 2007 WL 1932736, at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id. ("The fact that individuals discharged in retaliation for reporting illegal activities to
their superiors have no right of action under the Whistleblower Act does not compel the conclu-
sion that they have no right of action at all.").
118. Id. at *4.
119. See infra notes 121-197 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
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cation of legislative intent is required.12' The Illinois legislature did
not explicitly repeal the common law tort of retaliatory discharge
when it passed the Illinois Whistleblower Act. 22 Furthermore, the
doctrine of implied preemption does not apply.123 Finally, the legisla-
tive history of the Whistleblower Act shows that the legislature sought
to protect whistleblowers and did not contemplate cutting back ex-
isting common law protection. 124
1. The Legislature Did Not Expressly Repeal the Common Law
Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
Illinois courts generally require an express statement of legislative
intent before finding that a statute preempts a common law right or
duty. 125 The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is a familiar
rule of construction that a statute is not to be construed as changing
the common law farther than its terms expressly declare. ' 126 As noted
in Callahan, the Illinois Whistleblower Act is devoid of language indi-
cating legislative intent to preempt the tort of retaliatory discharge.
Thus, the First District correctly preserved the common law tort for
internal whistleblowers. 127
If the legislature had intended to preempt the tort of retaliatory
discharge, it would have done so explicitly. 28 Many statutes include
language indicating that they are meant to replace former common
law actions. 129  As the court in Skilling v. Skilling stated,
"[o]ccasionally, the legislature enacts statutes that are intended to re-
place actions that existed at common law or equity and to provide the
121. See, e.g., Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1017 (I1. 1996) (citing Peo-
ple v. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (11. 1992)) ("The primary rule of statutory construction is to
give effect to the true intent of the legislature.").
122. See infra notes 125-134 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 135-191 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 192-197 and accompanying text.
125. See Cadwallader v. Harris, 76 II1. 370, 370 (1875) (stating the general rule that "statutes
are not to be presumed to alter the common law farther than they expressly declare").
126. Canadian Bank of Commerce v. McCrea, 106 I1. 281, 289 (1882) (citing Cadwallader. 76
I11. at 370).
127. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *3-4
(Ill. App. Ct. July 3, 2007).
128. Id.; see also Nickels v. Burnett, 798 N.E.2d 817, 823 (11. App. Ct. 2003) ("Where the
legislature intends to preempt the subject matter at common law through a statutory enactment,
it will clearly specify that intent.").
129. The Nickels's court cited several statutes containing preemptive language, including the
Workers' Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5 (2004), and the Dramshop Act, 235
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-21 (2004). Nickels, 798 N.E.2d at 823.
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exclusive means for the future enforcement of existing rights.' 130 The
Workers' Compensation Act illustrates preemptive language:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the em-
ployer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by
the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service,
advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or em-
ployees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any em-
ployee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other
than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee
who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or
partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate,
or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury.13 1
Another example of explicit legislative intent to preempt occurs in the
Right of Publicity Act:
The rights and remedies provided for in this Act are meant to sup-
plant those available under the common law as of the effective date
of this Act, but do not affect an individual's common law rights as
they existed before the effective date of this Act. Except for the
common law right of publicity, the rights and remedies provided
under this Act are supplemental to any other rights and remedies
provided by law including, but not limited to, the common law right
of privacy.132
The legislature could have easily drafted a provision that explained
the Whistleblower Act's effect on other laws. 133 Yet the Act does not
mention the common law tort of retaliatory discharge. 34 Because the
legislature did not expressly preempt the common law, the Callahan
court was correct to preserve that remedy for internal whistleblowers.
130. 432 N.E.2d 881, 887 (111. App. Ct. 1982) (noting that former section 72 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act "abolished all actions that existed in common law or equity for post-judgment relief and
in their stead established an exclusive means for acquiring such relief").
131. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5(a) (2004) (emphasis added).
132. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/60 (2004) (emphasis added).
133. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *3 (I11.
App. Ct. July 3, 2007); see also Reeves v. Eckles, 222 N.E.2d 530, 531 (I11. App. Ct. 1966) ("The
legislature is presumed to have known of the common law action and had they intended to
repeal such action, it would have been a simple matter for them to have done so."). In Callahan,
the defendant argued that the legislature just as easily could have drafted a provision in the
statute explaining that it does not repeal the common law remedies. Defendant's Reply Brief in
Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss at 4, Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No.
05-L-6795 (Cook County Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 24, 2006). The defendant cited Nelson v. National Car
Rental System, Inc., No. 05-00374-JMS/LEK. 2006 WL 1814341, at *4-5 (D. Haw. June 30, 2006),
in which the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed on a retaliatory discharge theory since the
Hawaii Whistleblower Protection Act expressly stated that it did not limit common law rights or
remedies on the subject. Id. It is true that such a clear expression of intent would have ended
the matter. Illinois law, however, does not require the legislature to express its intent to leave
the common law unaffected. Conversely, Illinois courts presume that the statute adopts the
common law, unless otherwise specified. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
134. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1-35 (2004).
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2. The Legislature Did Not Impliedly Repeal the Common Law
Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
Because the legislature did not expressly declare its intent to pre-
empt retaliatory discharge, the Callahan court had to determine
whether implied preemption applied.135 The law does not favor im-
plied preemption. 136  The doctrine generally arises only where the
statute in question predated the common law claim,' 37 where there is
a conflict between the statute and the common law claim,138 or where
the statute is so extensive as to render the common law claim merit-
less. 139 None of these situations arises in the context of the
Whistleblower Act. Thus, the legislature did not impliedly repeal the
Act.
a. The Illinois Whistleblower Act Did Not Predate the Common
Law Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha illustrates an Act that predates the
common law. 140 In Debolt, an insured brought a common law action
against his insurance company to recover punitive damages for a
breach of good faith and fair dealing.' 41 The court recognized an ex-
pansion in the field of torts to situations involving contract claims, but
ultimately declined to recognize the common law action, because the
legislature had already provided a remedy for insureds who deal with
insurance companies that are "unreasonable and vexatious.' 142  The
Debolt court refused to recognize a new common law claim where a
statutory remedy already exists.' 43 Debolt is inapposite to whether
135. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *3 (Il1.
App. Ct. July 3, 2007); see also Cadwallader v. Harris, 76 Il1. 370 372 (1875) (indicating that
courts may also construe a statute "liberally according to its fair intent").
136. Callahan, 2007 WL 1932736, at *3 (citing Shores v. Senior Manor Nursing Ctr., 518
N.E.2d 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)); see also Reeves, 222 N.E.2d at 531 ("As a general rule, the
repeal of the common law by implication is not favored."); Walter v. N. Ins. Co., 18 N.E.2d 906,
908 (I1. 1939) ("It is a familiar rule of construction that statutes in derogation of the common
law cannot be construed as changing the common law beyond what is expressed by the words of
such statute or is necessarily implied from what is expressed.").
137. See infra notes 140-157 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 158-169 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 170-191 and accompanying text.
140. Debolt v. Mut. of Omaha, 371 N.E.2d 373 (Il. App. Ct. 1978).
141. Id. at 374.
142. Id. at 377 ("Where the legislature has provided a remedy on a subject matter we are not
only loath but in addition harbor serious doubts as to the desirability and wisdom of implement-
ing or expanding the legislative remedy by judicial decree.").
143. Jackson v. Callan Publ'g, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 413, 424-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) ("Defendants
rely on a line of cases that does not deal specifically with preemption but, rather, addresses the
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the Illinois Whistleblower Act preempts the common law, because the
tort of retaliatory discharge existed long before the statutory remedy.
Where a statute does not predate the common law claim, express
language indicating intent to preempt the common law is essential. 144
In Jackson v. Callan Publishing, Inc., the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs were precluded from bringing a common law claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, because the wrongs asserted also violated the
Illinois Solicitation for Charity Act. 45 Specifically, the court noted
that the common law claim predated the Act "by centuries" and
stated the following:
[W]here the legislature enacts a statute establishing a means to en-
force existing rights, there is no presumption that the statutory
means is intended either as an exclusive remedy or to abolish other
actions at common law or equity; the legislature usually must ex-
press or manifest the intent to give the statute such a preemptive
effect. 146
The court held that the Act did not preempt the common law claim.
Similarly, in Kosicki v. S.A. Healy Co., the plaintiffs brought a negli-
gence action against the defendant, a contractor for the sanitary dis-
trict of Chicago. 14 7 The Sanitary District Act "furnished redress for
property owners who claimed damages arising from the construction
of a legally authorized drain, sewer or other improvement by the sani-
tary district."' 148 The Act did not provide a remedy against indepen-
dent contractors. The defendant argued that it was immune from suit,
because "the remedy provided by the statute, being complete and ade-
quate, was exclusive." 149 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
Act was "cumulative and additional" to the common law cause of ac-
tion and not "exclusive," thus preserving the plaintiff's ability to bring
a negligence claim against the contractor. 150 The court stated that:
question of whether a novel common law tort action should be recognized to complement or
expand a statutory remedy for the wrong complained of.").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 424.
146. Id. at 425 (emphasis in original) (citing Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One Condo. Ass'n No.
I-A. 578 N.E.2d 621, 624-25 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that the General Not For Profit Corpo-
rations Act of 1986 did not provide the exclusive means by which the plaintiff could enjoin a
condominium association's ultra vires acts)). C.f. Skilling v. Skilling, 432 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Il.
App. Ct. 1982) ("Nothing in section 505(a) or the entire [Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act] indicates that the legislature intended to abolish all actions in equity that existed
for child support before the statute was enacted. Thus, [the] petition for an original order of
child support was a recognizable action in equity.").
147. Kosicki v. S.A. Healy Co., 44 N.E.2d 27, 28 (Ill. 1942).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 29.
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Where a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty or liabil-
ity, unknown to the common law, and at the same time gives a rem-
edy for its enforcement, the remedy so prescribed is exclusive.
Conversely, if no remedy is prescribed the right or liability may be
enforced by the appropriate remedy already provided. Where, how-
ever, a new remedy is given by statute, and there are no negative
words or other provisions rendering it exclusive, it will be deemed to
be cumulative only and not to take away prior remedies.' 15 1
The defendant in Kosicki argued that the Sanitary District Act created
a liability that did not exist at common law. 152 The court rejected this
argument, because, although the cause of action against the sanitary
district was new, the common law claim of negligence was not.153 The
court stated that "[h]ad it been the intention of the legislature to ex-
empt from the results of their negligence contractors engaged in work
for a municipality, by limiting the right of the property owner who has
suffered damage, appropriate language to accomplish this end would
undoubtedly have been employed."' 154
Likewise, the Illinois Whistleblower Act did not create a liability
that was "unknown at common law.' 55 The tort of retaliatory dis-
charge predates the Whistleblower Act by twenty-five years. 156 In ad-
dition, the legislature included no indication that the Act provided the
exclusive remedy for all whistleblower claims. 157 Therefore, Callahan
was correct in holding that the Whistleblower Act did not supplant
existing common law remedies for internal whistleblowers.
b. The Illinois Whistleblower Act and the Tort of Retaliatory
Discharge Can Coexist
A statute can coexist with the common law; Reeves v. Eckles is illus-
trative. 158 In Reeves, the plaintiff sought relief under a common law
151. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 2 LEWIS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 720 (2d ed.)).
152. Id.
153. Kosicki, 44 N.E.2d at 29. See also Johnson v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 982 F.2d 230, 232 (7th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that the Emergency Medical Services Act, which "provide[d]
remedies for violations of its provisions," did not preclude a claim under common law tort theo-
ries because the Act did not "constitute creation of a 'new tort;' rather, it is merely an applica-
tion of the ancient action of trespass"); Nickels v. Burnett, 798 N.E.2d 817, 823 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003) ("Generally, 'where a statute applies to an area formerly covered by the common law, [the
court] interpret[s] the statute as adopting the common law unless the General Assembly clearly
and specifically expressed an intention to change the common law."').
154. Kosicki, 44 N.E.2d at 29.
155. Johnson, 982 F.2d at 232.
156. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
157. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1-35 (2004).
158. Reeves v. Eckles, 222 N.E.2d 530, 531 (Il1. App. Ct. 1966).
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tort action for dog bite injuries. 159 A statutory action also provided
recovery for such injuries.1 60 The statute differed from the common
law action in that it did not require the dog owner to be aware of the
dog's dangerous proclivities. 16 1 The plaintiffs wanted to proceed
under the common law, but the trial court held that the statutory rem-
edy abolished the common law claim and provided the exclusive rem-
edy.162 The Second District disagreed, holding that the statute
provided "an alternative remedy" and that the plaintiff could proceed
under either the common law or the statute. 163 Elaborating on this
principle, the court stated that "[ilt is only where there is a fair repug-
nance between the common law and the statute, and both cannot be
carried into effect, that the common law must be considered as re-
pealed by implication."'1 64
The Illinois Whistleblower Act is analogous to the dog bite statute
in Reeves. The pertinent part of the Whistleblower Act states:
Retaliation for certain disclosures prohibited. (a) An employer
may not retaliate against an employee who discloses information in
a court, an administrative hearing, or before a legislative commis-
sion or committee, or in any other proceeding, where the employee
has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a vio-
lation of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation. (b) An em-
ployer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing
information to a government or law enforcement agency, where the
employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information dis-
closes a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation. 165
Because there was no "fair repugnance" between the dog bite statute
and the common law in Reeves, the provisions of the Whistleblower
Act and the common law tort of retaliatory discharge do not con-
flict. 166 The Act simply provides an alternative remedy for individuals
who make a disclosure before a court, administrator, or legislator or
to a government or law enforcement agency. Plaintiffs should be able
to proceed under either remedy, depending on the facts of their
159. Id. at 530.
160. Id. at 531.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 530.
163. Id. at 532.
164. Reeves, 222 N.E.2d at 531. Accord Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 326 N.E.2d 74, 82
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975) ("[W]e are guided by the rule of construction that statutes should be con-
strued with reference to the principles of the common law, and it will not be presumed that an
innovation thereon was intended farther than is specified or clearly to be implied." (citing Reid
v. Chi. Rys., 231 111. App. 58 (1923))).
165. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004).
166. See Reeves, 222 N.E.2d at 531.
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case. 67 Although the Act creates a remedy similar to the common
law claim, the manner in which the statute differs from the common
law indicates that the purpose of the statute was to expand the reme-
dies available for particular types of whistleblowing activities, not to
codify that area of law. 168 Therefore, as the Callahan court reasoned,
the two claims may coexist. 169
c. The Illinois Whistleblower Act is Not Comprehensive
Morris v. Ameritech Illinois illustrates complete preemption of the
common law by a comprehensive statute.170 In Morris, the court held
that section 14-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which governed civil
liability for eavesdropping, preempted a common law agency claim
premised on eavesdropping by an agent. 171 The court reasoned that
167. Id. ("Either action is available depending upon the facts of the case and it cannot be
fairly said that one remedy is contradictory to the other."). Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Man-
agement Associates, Ltd., 277 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2002), illustrates the situation where the tort of
retaliatory discharge will be allowed to coexist with an alternative statutory remedy. Id. at 943.
In Brandon, the plaintiff brought a diversity suit against his former employer alleging retaliatory
discharge under Illinois law. Id. at 940. The district court held that Brandon's claim failed,
because the anti-retaliation provision of the Federal Claims Act (FCA) provided an alternative
remedy. Id. at 941. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, pointing out that Illinois courts had "hinted
in dicta that the claim may still be rejected if an adequate alternative remedy exists to vindicate
the retaliatory discharge." Id. at 943 (emphasis in original) (citing Stebbings v. Univ. of Chi., 726
N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)). However, in order to recover under the FCA, an indi-
vidual must have filed an FCA enforcement action. Id. at 944. Because the plaintiff had chosen
to raise his concerns within his company and had not yet filed an FCA action, he did not qualify
for protection under the FCA. Id. The court noted that "[t]he tort of retaliatory discharge...
does not require the employee to have reported the allegedly illegal conduct to the authorities"
and allowed him to proceed under the common law. Id. Like the federal statute in Brandon, the
Whistleblower Act requires whistleblowers to report their concerns publicly rather than pri-
vately. As illustrated by Brandon, however, this does not automatically bar retaliatory discharge
claims, because the two remedies can exist simultaneously. See also Sherman v. Kraft Gen.
Foods, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) does not preempt the common law tort of retaliatory discharge, and that
failure to make a report to OSHA was "not fatal to plaintiff's case"). These cases also illustrate
courts' reluctance to preempt the common law claim even when there is another anti-retaliation
statute that could provide protection, especially when the fired employee would not fit within
the statutory scheme. In other words, public policy does not favor preemption of the tort of
retaliatory discharge, especially when doing so would leave a whistleblower without any remedy.
168. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. Specifically, the statute provides special
protection for individuals who report "a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation"
to a "government or law enforcement agency." 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004). The addi-
tional protections afforded in these specific situations include the extension of a remedy to inde-
pendent contractors, expanded remedies such as reasonable attorney's fees, and the imposition
of civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Act. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/5, 174/25, and
174/30 (2004).
169. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *3 (I11.
App. Ct. 2007).
170. Morris v. Ameritech Ill., 785 N.E.2d 62, 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
171. Id.
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the Code provision, which established limits on the situations in which
a principal could be held civilly liable for eavesdropping by its agent,
entirely superseded the area formerly covered by the common law.
172
The Morris court relied heavily upon In re Visitation with C.B.L. in
reaching its decision. 173 In C.B.L., petitioner sought visitation with
the child of her ex-girlfriend, who had been artificially inseminated.
174
The petitioner, who had helped care for the child for over a year, ar-
gued that, under the common law, she had standing to seek visitation
as a de facto parent.1 75 The court rejected her argument, holding that
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act),
which covers non-custodial visitation, preempted any former common
law claims. 176 The court recognized the traditional rule that a statute
will be interpreted as adopting the common law absent legislative in-
tent to change the common law, 177 but ultimately found that the Mar-
riage Act had "evolved from a simple, straightforward codification of
the common law of parental visitation to a complex and ever-growing
statutory provision."' 78 Therefore, the statute "constitute[d] a de-
tailed and comprehensive legislative enactment on the subject of visi-
tation," rendering any common law claims meritless. 79
The Illinois Whistleblower Act is distinguishable from the Marriage
Act. Unlike the Marriage Act, the Whistleblower Act is new and has
not undergone an evolution that would lead a court to believe that the
general assembly had entirely abandoned the common law tort. Fur-
thermore, the Whistleblower Act does not represent a comprehensive
enactment of retaliatory discharge claims.' 80 The Act does not ad-
dress claims by individuals who make disclosures that implicate public
policy but do not violate a "[s]tate or federal law, rule, or regula-
tion." 8 Courts have long recognized these claims at common law. 182
Nor does the Act mention individuals who report improper activity
directly to their employers, even though those individuals' claims have
172. Id.
173. In re Visitation with C.B.L.. 723 N.E.2d 316 (I11. App. Ct. 1999).
174. Id. at 317.
175. Id. at 318.
176. Id. at 320.
177. Id. at 318.
178. Id. at 319. "No longer is [the Marriage Act] simply a codification of prior common law. It
has been altered far too many times by amendments far too complex and comprehensive for
such a narrow conception of that statutory section to retain any further validity." Id. at 320.
179. C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 320.
180. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
181. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004).
182. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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been recognized at common law since 1982.183 Given that the legisla-
ture chose not to address these broad areas traditionally protected by
the common law, Callahan was correct not to assume that the legisla-
ture intended to silently dissolve these common law protections.
In sum, a court may find that a statute impliedly repealed a com-
mon law claim for several reasons. First, a court may prevent a com-
mon law remedy from developing where a statutory remedy already
exists.' 84 Second, a court may find that a statute implicitly repealed
the common law where the statute is inimical to the common law
claim. 185 Finally, Morris and C.B.L. stand for the proposition that, in
the rare instance in which a statute completely covers an area for-
merly addressed by the common law, a court could decide that the
legislature intended the statute to preempt the entire common law
area. 186 None of these situations apply to the Whistleblower Act. The
statute deals with an area of law that has existed at common law for
decades. Furthermore, these statutory and common law claims can
coexist.' 87
The Illinois Whistleblower Act is not comprehensive and does not
cover the entire field of whistleblowing claims.188 In each preemption
case, legislative intent remains the paramount consideration. 89 There
is no evidence that the Illinois Whistleblower Act represented a delib-
erate choice by the legislature to limit the reach of retaliatory dis-
charge claims. The result in Callahan was correct, because a court
considering whether a statute repeals a common law cause of action
"should not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the legisla-
ture."'190 Without a clear indication that the legislature intended to
"preempt the field," 191 the Callahan court was wise not to infer the
requisite intent.
183. See Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 444 N.E.2d 588, 592-93 (111. App. Ct. 1982).
184. See supra notes 140-157 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 158-169 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 170-179 and accompanying text. See also Cunningham v. Brown, 174
N.E.2d 153 (Il1. 1961); Mazur v. Hunt, 592 N.E.2d 335 (II1. App. Ct. 1992); Combs v. Insurance
Co. of Ill., 497 N.E.2d 503 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986).
187. See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
190. Reeves v. Eckles, 222 N.E.2d 530 532 (I11. App. Ct. 1966).
191. Mazur v. Hunt, 592 N.E.2d 335, 338 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
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3. The Legislative History of the Whistleblower Act Indicates that
the Legislature Did Not Intend to Preempt the Common
Law Tort of Retaliatory Discharge
The Illinois General Assembly's Whistleblower Act debates demon-
strate that the legislature did not intend to preempt the common law
tort of retaliatory discharge, but rather intended to ensure protection
for whistleblowers who disclose violations of the law to the govern-
ment. 92 The chief House sponsor of the bill, Representative John A.
Fritchey, stated that "Senate Bill 1872 is a further enhancement of the
whistleblower protections in the state."'193 Moreover, these debates
indicate that Representative Fritchey mistakenly believed that the
common law tort of retaliatory discharge did not protect external
whistleblowers and that the reason for passing the bill was to provide
additional protection:
Fritchey: ".... you do not have a specific remedy today for a retalia-
tory discharge stemming from going to the authorities to report a
violation of law."
Bost: "If a judge ruled that it was a clear case where they were fired
for this type action ... a judge couldn't just automatically say, you
know, what you did was wrong?"
192. See H.R. 93-63, Reg. Sess. (Ill. May 22, 2003) ("What this does is prohibit an employer
from taking any actions to prevent an employee from disclosing information to the government,
if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that there was a violation of law.") (statement of
Rep. Fritchey); S. 93-27, Reg. Sess. (Ill. Mar. 27, 2003).
193. H.R. 93-63, Reg. Sess. (Ill. May 22, 2003) (emphasis added). Likewise, Senator Peter J.
Roskam stated that "[t]here's nobody that wants to create ... a situation where whistleblowers
in good faith, who are coming forward, aren't protected." S. 93-27, Reg. Sess. (Ill. Mar. 27,
2003). In the wake of corporate scandals like Enron, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act into law on July 30, 2002. Delikat & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 27. This Act, which deals
with a variety of corporate accountability issues, also "makes it clear that Congress was intent
upon closing loopholes in existing state and federal laws that provide protection for
whistleblowers." Id. (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6439-40 (2002)). See also Richard E. Moberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV.
1107, 1109 (2006) (describing the "structural model" of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which
"requires that corporations provide employees with a standardized channel to report organiza-
tional misconduct internally within the corporation"). Following this federal act, many states
began to "[revisit] and [fortify] their whistleblower protections." Delikat & Rosenberg, supra
note 9, at 27. Sarbanes-Oxley is commonly known as "SOX," and these state enactments are
sometimes referred to as "mini-SOX." 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, FINANCIAL SERVICES
BANK OPERATIONS, SARBANES-OXLEY REOUIREMENTs (2006), available at http://
www.westlaw.com (follow "50 State Surveys" hyperlink; search for 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1
(text should be in small caps); follow "39. SOX" hyperlink). The timing of the Illinois
Whistleblower Act's enactment and the legislative debates make it likely that Illinois was enact-
ing its own "mini-SOX." See id. If this is the case, the legislature's goal was far from reigning in
whistleblower protections. Rather, it appears that the legislature was following the national
trend of increasing whistleblower protection. In fact, in the legislative history, Representative
Fritchey cited the Enron scandal as an example of the type of situation involving a retaliatory
action against an employee. H.R. 93-63. Reg. Sess. (I11. May 22, 2003).
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Fritchey: ".... The judge could say, I think what you did was wrong,
but you didn't violate the law. Mike, you hit it on the head and
that's exactly why we need this Bill because you and I ... both
think that somebody should have protection from doing that. And
as we stand here today, they don't have that protection."
Bost: "Under civil action, they don't have that?"
Fritchey: ".... in my sincere belief, and I'm pretty sure I'm right on
this one, you do not have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
today stemming from going to the authorities to disclose a violation
of law."
Fritchey: "Common sense would tell you that you should have that
protection and this law would codify that."194
This dialogue illustrates that the Whistleblower Act was based on the
erroneous notion that external whistleblowers did not have a common
law remedy and that the legislature wanted to provide this protection.
In Jones v. Dew, the Northern District of Illinois interpreted Repre-
sentative Fritchey's comments as proof that he intended the Act to be
a "codification of the common law tort of retaliatory discharge based
on [whistleblowing] activities. ' 195 Representative Fritchey, however,
only referred to codifying a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
stemming from disclosures to government or law enforcement agen-
cies, a cause of action he apparently did not know existed at common
law. There is no evidence that the legislature wished to abrogate long-
standing common law protections. Simply put, the legislature could
not have intended to repeal a cause of action that it did not know
existed. Illinois courts have consistently stated that "[a] statute will be
construed as changing common law only to the extent that the terms
thereof warrant, or as necessarily implied from what is expressed. '196
In Jones, the court inferred too much from these legislative com-
ments. Complete preemption of the common law was neither neces-
sary nor prudent. The Act evolved from an erroneous understanding
of the common law, at least in the mind of the chief House sponsor.
As the debates illustrate, the legislature never considered internal
whistleblowers, and the debates involved no discussion of the Act's
effect on the tort of retaliatory discharge. 197
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Jones v. Dew, No. 06-C-3577, 2006 WL 3718053, at *3 (N.D. I11. Dec. 13, 2006). Accord
Riedlinger v. Hudson Respiratory Care, Inc., 478 F. Supp 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. I11. 2007) ("Repre-
sentative Fritchey ... explained that the intent of the statute was to codify the common law tort
of retaliatory discharge.").
196. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Zehnder, 738 N.E.2d 145, 153 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (citing Hawkins
v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652 (I11. App. Ct. 1981)).
197. See H.R. 93-63, Reg. Sess. (I11. May 22, 2003).
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B. Prior to Callahan, Courts Failed to Analyze the
Preemption Issue
Before Callahan, several cases failed to apply the proper legal anal-
ysis to whether the Whistleblower Act repealed the common law
whistleblower remedy. As illustrated in Part II.C, employer-defend-
ants in retaliatory discharge suits pointed to Sutherland's comment
that the Whistleblower Act codified the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge. 19 Sutherland, however, did not address preemption or apply
the criteria that Illinois courts have set forth to determine whether a
statute preempted the common law. Furthermore, the court analyzed
the plaintiff's whistleblower claim under the traditional whistleblower
prong of the tort of retaliatory discharge. 99 If the court had believed
that the Whistleblower Act provided the only means by which an em-
ployee could recover for whistleblowing activities, it would have ana-
lyzed the whistleblower claim under the Act. 20 0 In short, these dicta
did nothing to resolve the preemption issue.
Similarly, in Sprinkle v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., the Southern
District of Illinois stated that the Illinois Whistleblower Act codifies
the common law tort of retaliatory discharge. 20 1 In that case, the
plaintiff contended that he was fired for his refusal to engage in what
he believed was an illegal activity.20 2 The court found that the
Whistleblower Act codified the common law, reasoning that a plaintiff
can state a cause of action for whistleblowing "when an employee is
fired for refusing to engage in illegal activity. '20 3 Because, in this cir-
cumstance, it made no difference whether the plaintiff proceeded
198. See supra Part II.C.
199. Sutherland v. Norfolk S. Ry., 826 N.E.2d 1021, 1027-29 (I1. App. Ct. 2005). The court
held that the plaintiff was not a whistleblower because reporting his injury to his employer did
not "affect the citizens of the State collectively." Id. at 1028.
200. Notably, the court failed to mention that the plaintiff did not report his injury to a gov-
ernment or law enforcement agency and that he did not report a violation of a state or federal
law, rule, or regulation, both requirements of the Whistleblower Act. Id.; see also 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 174/15 (2004). On the contrary, the court recognized that the tort of retaliatory
discharge requires an employee to make a complaint "either to an outside law enforcement or
regulatory authority or to internal company management." Sutherland, 826 N.E.2d at 1027 (em-
phasis added). Furthermore, the court analyzed the plaintiff's claim under the Palmateer rule
requiring an employee to show that his discharge violated a "clear mandate of public policy,"
which does not apply under the Whistleblower Act. Id.; see supra notes 69-70 and accompany-
ing text.
201. Sprinkle v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 04-CV-4116-JPG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49203,
at *14 (S.D. Il1. July 19, 2006) (citing Sutherland v. Norfolk S. Ry., 826 N.E.2d 1021 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005)).
202. Id. at *10.
203. Id. at *14-15 (citing Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (11. 1981);
Stebbings v. Univ. of Chi., 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)). The Whistleblower Act
states that "[an employer may not retaliate against an employee for refusing to participate in an
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under the Act or the common law, the court did not analyze whether
the Act entirely preempted common law whistleblower claims. Just as
the Sutherland footnote added nothing to the determination of
whether plaintiffs could state a whistleblower claim under the tort of
retaliatory discharge, the Sprinkle court's bald assertion that the Act
codified the common law did not resolve the issue.
Nevertheless, the Jones and Riedlinger courts based their holdings
that the Act preempted the common law solely on the footnote in
Sutherland, dicta in Sprinkle, and Representative Fritchey's comment
that the Whistleblower Act codifies the common law tort of retalia-
tory discharge. 20 4 Because the plaintiffs in these cases did not make
their complaints to a government or law enforcement agency, the trial
court determined that they did not fall within the protection of the
Whistleblower Act and dismissed their claims.20 5
The trial court's decision that the Act preempted retaliatory dis-
charge was conclusory and ignored the criteria that Illinois courts
have developed to resolve preemption questions.20 6 Simply stating
that the Act codifies the tort does not determine whether it preempts
or repeals it.207 None of the cases Jones or Riedlinger cited even ad-
activity that would result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation." 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 174/20 (2004).
204. See Riedlinger v. Hudson Respiratory Care, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ill.
2007); Jones v. Dew, No. 06 C 3577, 2006 WL 3718053, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2006) (treating
the Whistleblower Act as "a codification of the common law tort of retaliatory discharge based
on whistle-blowing activities").
205. Riedlinger, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 1055; Jones, 2006 WL 3718053 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13,
2006) (citing Smith v. Madison Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-00142DRH, 2005 WL 1460301, at *1
(S.D. Ill. June 21, 2005)). In Smith, plaintiff sued under the Illinois Whistleblower Act claiming
that she was fired for reporting alleged sexual harassment to Madison Mutual's lawyer. Smith,
2005 WL 1460301, at *1. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, explaining that
"[w]hile the Act prevents retaliation against an employee who disclosed information to a govern-
ment or law enforcement agency, it does not protect an employee who disclosed information to
her own company." Id. The issue of whether the Act preempts the common law tort, however,
was not squarely before the court. In that case, the court merely set forth an element necessary
to make out a claim under the Whistleblower Act. The court did not mention the tort of retalia-
tory discharge or suggest that the plaintiff could not have proceeded under that cause of action.
Id.
206. The Jones court stated that "[a]lthough only a few courts have construed the
[Whistleblower] Act, there is some indication that the Act codifies, and therefore preempts, any
common law retaliatory discharge claim based on whistle-blowing activities." Jones, 2006 WL
3718053, at *3 (N.D. II1. Dec. 13, 2006) (emphasis added). This repeated assertion that the Act
"codifies" the common law was hardly a substitute for legal analysis of established principles of
statutory construction.
207. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (8th ed. 2004) defines "codification" as "[t]he process of
compiling, arranging, and systematizing the laws of a given jurisdiction, or of a discrete branch of
the law, into an ordered code." This definition did not resolve the issue of whether "codifying" a
law would "preempt" or "repeal" related laws.
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dressed the question of preemption.20 8 In addition, Representative
Fritchey's comment that the Act codifies the tort was directed at situa-
tions involving whistleblowers who report to government or law en-
forcement agencies. 20 9 He said nothing about preempting this area of
the common law. In short, Callahan correctly recognized that neither
the Jones nor the Riedlinger court "conducted an analysis of the issue
of when a statute preempts or repeals a common-law remedy by
implication." 210
V. IMPACT
By enacting the Whistleblower Act, the Illinois legislature demon-
strated its concern for protecting people who are fired as a result of
their efforts to protect the public.21' If the Callahan court had de-
cided that the Whistleblower Act repealed the tort of retaliatory dis-
charge, many individuals who are fired for their good faith efforts to
report illegal or improper conduct would be left without legal redress,
a result that the legislature did not intend.212 This, in turn, would have
prevented many people from reporting wrongful activities.213 Aside
from the doctrinal arguments against preemption, there are no logical
arguments for refusing to extend protection to internal
whistleblowers. On the contrary, there are many reasons why policy-
makers should encourage internal whistleblowing.214
To decide which individuals should be afforded protection from re-
taliatory discharge, it is important to consider the purposes of
whistleblower protection.215 The primary goal of state whistleblower
208. See supra notes 91-203 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
210. Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehab. Ctr., No. 1-06-3178, 2007 WL 1932736, at *2 (Il.
App. Ct. July 3, 2007).
211. See supra notes 192-197 and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. See infra notes 219-224 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
215. Professors Dworkin and Callahan traced whistleblowing protection from its federal ori-
gins, illustrating that whistleblower protection was originally incorporated into federal statutes
that had primary objectives other than protecting whistleblowers. Terry Morehead Dworkin &
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the
Organization, and Society, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 269 (1991) (providing examples, including the
Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988), the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)( 4) (1988), and the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(1988)). They explain that courts generally construed federal acts broadly enough to protect
both internal and external whistleblowers. Id. at 270 ("As the circuit courts have reasoned,
Congress intended to protect internal disclosures because that form of whistleblowing 'share[s] a
broad, remedial purpose of protecting workers from retaliation based on their concerns for
safety and quality."') (quoting Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir.
1985)). Subsequent state whistleblowing statutes, however, generally had whistleblower protec-
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statutes is to correct wrongdoing.216 Some states have determined
that the best way to accomplish this is to require individuals to report
wrongdoing to the law enforcement or regulatory agency capable of
investigating and correcting the problem. 21 7 An approach requiring
external whistleblowing, however, is flawed. 218 Employees are more
likely to initially report improper activity internally.2 19 If internal
whistleblowers are not protected, "reporting of wrongdoing would be
reduced as unaddressed retaliation deters potential whistleblowers
and leads to the laws not being as effectively enforced. '220 Further-
more, studies show that external whistleblowers are more likely to be
victims of retaliation than internal whistleblowers. 221 Therefore, re-
quiring whistleblowers to report to a government or law enforcement
agency would create a disincentive for employees to report
misconduct. 222
Moreover, if the Callahan court had decided that the Whistleblower
Act preempts the common law claim, it would have created a perverse
incentive for employers to fire employees who blow the whistle before
they have a chance to report to law enforcement, thus, leaving those
whistleblowers without a remedy. 223 This would defeat the purpose of
whistleblower protection: encouraging employers to root out wrong-
doing and take prompt action without requiring outside intervention.
In short, refusing to extend protection to internal whistleblowers
tion as their main objective, and most differed from the federal model by "spell[ing] out how the
whistleblowing should proceed." Dworkin & Callahan, supra, at 276.
216. Id. at 281.
217. Id. ("These statutes make it clear that their purpose is to cut down on public fraud, waste,
abuse of authority, and dangers to public health and safety.").
218. See Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 188 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The employee who
chooses to approach his employer should not be denied a remedy simply because a direct report
to law enforcement agencies might effectuate the exposure of crime more quickly. This would be
a nonsensical distinction.").
219. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 301.
220. Id. at 281 (citing Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 778,
781 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1985)).
221. Id. at 302.
222. Id.
223. See Hicks v. Clyde Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 722 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
[T]o hold [that internal complaints are not protected] would allow employers to thwart
an employee's retaliatory discharge claim by firing the employee before he had a
chance to reach authorities. Such a system would reward ill-willed employers and pe-
nalize well-intentioned employees who attempt to rectify wrongdoing internally prior
to taking public action. This court does not believe that the Illinois Supreme Court
would adopt such an unpalatable construction of the tort.
Id. at 504.
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would ultimately harm employers' ability to prevent and correct
wrongdoing, the central aims of whistleblower protection.
224
A secondary purpose of many state whistleblower statutes is to pun-
ish the wrongdoer. 225 Specifically, another reason that some states de-
veloped "a preference for external whistleblowing" was "a desire to
prevent wrongdoers from escaping punishment. '226 Some believe that
this goal may be more effectively accomplished by mandating external
whistleblowing, because an employer who is "the recipient of a
whistleblower's information can play a significant role in controlling
its dissemination, with the intent of minimizing the consequences of a
possible criminal prosecution. '227 But this secondary purpose should
not significantly diminish the Act's primary purpose: preventing and
correcting misbehavior. 228 Policymakers should encourage employees
to report to their employers, because employers are often in the best
position to address and correct misbehavior.2 29
Other rationales for denying protection to internal whistleblowers
are also unconvincing. For instance, some argue that internal
whistleblowers are unable to show that their discharge was in viola-
tion of public policy, because an internal report is a private matter.
230
A similar argument is that a discharge following an internal disclosure
"resulted from a management dispute rather than a desire to retali-
ate. '231 These arguments were rejected long ago by Illinois courts,
224. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 301.
225. Id. at 276. 281.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 284. The legislative history suggests that the sponsors of the Illinois Whistleblower
Act had in mind the dual goals of protecting public policy and punishing violations of the law.
See H.R. 93-63, Reg. Sess. (Ill. May 22, 2003). Representative Fritchey stated:
This is really as much, if not more so, a public safety Bill than it is an employment Bill
or a whistleblower Bill. You do not want to have employees afraid to go to the authori-
ties to disclose an environmental violation, a worker protection violation, a labor law
violation, a tax evasion violation and not go to the authorities because they're afraid
that doing the right thing will cost them their job.
There is no evidence, however, that the legislature intended to give external whistleblowers pro-
tection at the exclusion of internal whistleblowers. See id.
228. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 185 ("Although prosecution may be a legitimate
secondary goal of public whistleblower protection. it should not be permitted to hamper the
primary objective of most whistleblowing statutes, which is to correct the wrongdoing as quickly
and efficiently as possible.").
229. Lanning v. Morris Mobile Meals, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
230. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 295, 303.
231. Id. at 296. Dworkin and Callahan discussed the fact that whisleblowers can be viewed as
dissidents. Id. at 299 (citing Janet P. Near & Maria P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowers in Organizations:
Dissidents or Reformers?, 9 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 321, 327-28, 330 (1987)). The
legislative history of the Whistleblower Act reflects the fear of Illinois legislators that it will be
too easy for employees to make incorrect or frivolous accusations. H.R. 93-63, Reg. Sess. (Ill.
May 22, 2003). Even if Illinois legislators wanted to limit whistleblower protection, however,
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which determined that "internal reports can also lead to the correc-
tion of behavior in violation of public policy. 232
In addition to benefiting the employee and the public, a scheme
that encourages internal whistleblowing also benefits employers.
Professors Dworkin and Callahan articulated this point as follows:
[W]histleblowers may be seen as reformers whose actions often
benefit the organization. They are one of the least expensive and
most efficient sources of feedback about mistakes the firm may be
making. They can help identify unsafe products or practices, waste-
ful or fraudulent actions, and other harmful or criminal behavior.
Whistleblowers can bypass the institutional barriers to communica-
tion found especially in large organizations, benefiting their employ-
ers not only by identifying problems, but also by suggesting
solutions. '"233
Further, employers benefit from internal disclosures, because they
give employers the chance to correct problems before they are re-
vealed to the public.2 34 Likewise, a system of internal reporting bene-
there is no legitimate reason for drawing the line between internal and external whistleblowers.
Further, Illinois legislators never expressed an interest in denying protection to internal
whistleblowers.
232. Lanning, 720 N.E.2d at 1130. Accord Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372,
376 (Ill. 1985) ("We do not agree ... that the question whether the facts as alleged involved
public policy, or a matter of private concern, depended on whether a complaint was made to the
regulatory authorities."). Dworkin and Callahan also debunked these arguments. In response
to the argument that an internal disclosure is a private concern, they explained that "[t]he exis-
tence of public policy supporting a cause of action for employer conduct is derogation of that
policy-that is, discharge of an employee-should not be contingent upon the action taken by
the employee which causes the dismissal." Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 295. Instead,
courts should focus on the employer's conduct, and whether it violated an articulated public
policy. Id. With regard to the argument that "internal whistleblowing is disruptive of employee
control and productivity," Dworkin and Callahan pointed out that "all cases holding the dismis-
sal of an at-will worker actionable threaten the employer's legitimate interest in maximizing
employee control and productivity .... [E]xternal whistleblowing would seem to be at least as
invasive of normal operating procedures as internal whistleblowing, if not more so." Id. at 297.
They further argue that whistleblowing is actually "prosocial behavior, or positive social behav-
ior that is intended to benefit other persons." Id. at 303. Dworkin and Callahan pointed to
research showing that whistleblowing is not the norm, and that "employees who go against the
norm and blow the whistle tend to do so when they have direct evidence of wrongdoing and the
wrongdoing is serious." Id. (citing Maria P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, Individual and Situational
Correlates of Whistle-blowing, 41 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 276 (1988)). Contrary to the belief
that many whistleblowers are traitors to their organizations, Dworkin and Callahan stated that
"incidents of groundless or spiteful whisteblowing ... are rare." Id. Moreover, studies show that
many whistleblowers "are among the most dedicated and committed employees in the organiza-
tion." FREDERICK ELLISTON ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING: MANAGING DISSENT IN THE WORK-
PLACE 135 (1985).
233. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 299-300.
234. Id. at 300 ("If problems exist, the employer has the opportunity privately to take correc-
tive action and thereby reduce the likelihood of lost business, adverse publicity, litigation, fines
or other criminal sanctions, and other adverse consequences."); Moberly, supra note 193, at 1151
("This early detection allows corporations to avoid costs related to the negative publicity and
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fits employers by giving them a chance to clarify misunderstandings in
the event that an employee mistakenly believes that wrongdoing has
occurred. 235
There are, however, general problems associated with protecting
whistleblowers. 236 First, in situations involving internal whistleblow-
ing, it is often difficult to prove retaliatory discharge, because the re-
ports involve interpersonal relationships. 237  Furthermore,
whistleblowing generally hinders the employer's "legitimate interest
in managerial decision-making and maximizing control and effi-
ciency. '238 Similarly, some fear that a system of internal reporting
would cause employers to refrain from "effectuating well-founded dis-
charges" for fear of being sued and that it would cause "a less cooper-
ative workplace atmosphere. '239
While these concerns may be valid, the ability to enforce the objec-
tives of whistleblower protection-correcting wrongdoing and enforc-
ing public policy-are present in both internal and external
whistleblowing.240 Between the two, external whistleblowing often
has a more disruptive and detrimental impact on employer control
and workplace atmosphere. 241 Finally, even if employers must give up
some control, creating an exception to the employment at-will doc-
trine reflects the desirability of encouraging whistleblowing to rectify
wrongdoing.242 In order to make whistleblowing an "effective tool in
combating organizational wrongdoing, '243 the legislature and judici-
ary must protect employees from retaliatory discharge, regardless of
the recipient of the disclosure.
government intervention that follows external whistleblowing."). Cf. Belline v. K-Mart Corp.
940 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that requiring external whistleblowing would create
"perverse incentives by inviting concerned employees to bypass internal channels altogether and
immediately summon the police").
235. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 304.
236. See id. at 305-06.
237. Id. at 305 (citing John H. Conway, Comment. Protecting the Private Sector At Will Em-
ployee Who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy,
1977 Wis. L. REV. 777, 782; Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416-21 (1967)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 306.
240. Id. ("Despite these concerns, whistleblowers well serve society's interests in encouraging
lawful behavior and public accountability, to the extent that their actions prevent or redress
wrongdoing.").
241. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 215, at 306.
242. Id. at 306 n.214.
243. Id. at 307.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Callahan court correctly decided that the Illinois Whistleblower
Act does not preempt the common law tort of retaliatory discharge.
The court grounded its holding in principles of statutory construction
and preemption. First, the Whistleblower Act contains no express
language addressing the common law tort, which indicates that the
legislature did not intend to preempt the tort. Second, the Act does
not provide a new, comprehensive cause of action that could be read
to impliedly replace the common law cause of action. Rather, the Act
provides a supplementary remedy. Finally, there is evidence that the
legislature wanted to provide additional protection for whistleblowers.
Thus, the legislature did not intend the Act to limit whistleblower pro-
tection. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that "the Common law,
having been classified and arranged into a logical system of doctrine,
principles, rules, and practices, furnishes one of the most reliable
backgrounds upon which analysis of the objects and purposes of a
statute can be determined. '244 The development of the tort of retalia-
tory discharge reflects the reasoned and deliberate decision of Illinois
courts to expand the remedy to both internal and external
whistleblowers.2 45 These courts recognized that Illinois public policy
may be implicated whenever an employee is discharged for blowing
the whistle. For these reasons, the Callahan court wisely held that the
Whistleblower Act does not preempt the tort of retaliatory discharge.
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